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PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS IN THE 
GLOBAL ARENA: THAILAND'S STRUGGLE 
BETWEEN PROGRESS AND PROTECTIONISM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International patent protection is one of the most important 
trade issues affecting both developed and developing nations. I Due 
to the high cost of product development and an increasingly com-
petitive international market, developed nations such as the United 
States are under pressure from domestic industries to protect their 
intellectual property innovations in foreign countries.2 Companies 
within developed countries often believe that piracy of their tech-
nology is the most significant obstacle to foreign market access.3 
Many foreign governments, however, condone patent infringe-
ment and support domestic "copycat" companies with protectionist 
laws. Such is the case with Thailand and its pharmaceutical industry. 
The United States is engaged in an on-going debate with Thailand 
over the lack of comprehensive pharmaceutical patent protection 
within Thailand.4 Thailand, however, has resisted the demands of 
the United States for patent protection because, in Thailand's opin-
ion, the pharmaceutical patent debate should be approached from 
a "social welfare" and not a purely economic perspective.5 Thailand 
claims that the protection of pharmaceutical product patents dis-
criminates against those who cannot afford to pay for more expen-
1 Intellectual Property, Domestic Productivity and Trade: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Property, and the Administration of justice of the House Comm. on the judiciary, lO1st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Comm. Hearing]. The United States Trade 
Representative, Carla Hills, stated: 
/d. 
[T]his is a topic of the utmost importance. Americans who engage in international 
trade are very concerned about the harm to United States trading interests that 
results from the lack of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property 
rights in many foreign markets. Our businesses are losing money, but more impor-
tantly, our economy is losing the competitive edge we gain from research and 
development, innovation and creativity. As a nation, we simply cannot afford it. 
2 See John Pearson et aI., The Patent Pirates are Finally Walking the Plank, Bus. WK., Feb. 
17, 1992, at 125. 
g Id. 
4 See infra part V.A. 
'See Nick B. Williams, Jr., Thai Producers Grapple with Growing Piracy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 
14, 1988, § 4, at 9. 
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sive patented modern technology.6 The use of "protectionist" pro-
visions, such as compulsory licensing and working requirements, 
supports Thailand's public health justification.7 Thailand seeks to 
provide affordable medicine to the public through limiting the 
ability of multinational companies (MNCs) to protect their discov-
eries with patents. The Thai government believes that MNCs will 
create monopolies, thus abusing their presence in the Thai mar-
ketplace at the expense of Thai pharmaceutical needs.8 Beyond this 
public health concern, however, Thailand must face the more con-
troversial domestic economic factor in the patent debate: granting 
MNCs exclusive control of their inventions may destroy Thailand's 
lucrative copycat drug manufacturing industry.9 Technological de-
pendency is a short-term plan that cannot support Thailand's rapid 
integration into the world economy.IO 
Because of its diversified export-oriented economy and free-
market philosophy, Thailand is one of Southeast Asia's greatest 
economic success stories. ll Between 1987 and 1990, real economic 
growth averaged eleven percent; this growth, in turn, created four 
consecutive budget surpluses. 12 The tourism and manufacturing 
industries are gradually replacing the once dominant agricultural 
sector. 13 Unlike many developing nations, which carry overwhelm-
ing debts that hinder economic development, Thailand uses surplus 
government revenues to reduce debt obligations and build re-
serves. 14 In early 1991, Thailand's economy experienced a slow-
down because of the Gulf War and high domestic interest rates. 15 
This break in rapid growth, however, will actually benefit Thailand 
because the country can now focus on its infrastructure problems 
while maintaining its competitive international position.16 
6 Id. 
7 See infra text accompanying note 62 (definition of compulsory licensing). 
8 Helen E. White, Thailand's Drug-Copying Companies Keep Prices Down, Upset Foreign Firms, 
WALL ST.]', Dec. 1, 1986, at 25. 
9 Id. 
10 See Karel Jansen, Thailand: The Next NIC7, 21]. CONTEMP. ASIA 13,26 (1991). 
II AMERICAN EMBASSY BANGKOK, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PuB. No. FET 92-06, FOREIGN 
ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES: THAILAND 3 (Feb. 
1992) [hereinafter 1992 FET]. 
12 Id. 
15 Id. at 2. In 1991, agriculture was 11.5% of the Gross Domestic Product compared to 
23.2% in 1980. Id. at 4. 
14 Id. at 2. In 1990, Thailand's external debt reached $11.25 billion and debt service 
ratio decreased 2% to 9.1 %. Id. Debt service ratio is the ratio of a country's ability to meet 
cash requirements to satisfy annual interest and principal repayment obligations. LEs SEPLAKI, 
ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY AND HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 63 (1991). 
15 1992 FET, supra note 11, at 6. 
16 Id. 
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While Thailand's industrial sector expands rapidly, nearly half 
of the country's population lives in rural areas and relies on cheap 
drugs for self-medicationY The lack of pharmaceutical patent pro-
tection enables the copycat drug industry to provide rural Thai 
society with inexpensive drug products. Any reaction to interna-
tional pressure to provide comprehensive protection to pharmaceu-
tical products would require the Thai government to resolve the 
tension between the social need for pharmaceutical products and 
the lack of financial resources necessary for much needed research 
and development (R&D) projects. Nations which devote financial 
resources to public health realize that withholding patent protection 
from pharmaceuticals does not benefit public health or their econ-
omies. Developed countries typically spend five percent of their 
gross national product (GNP) on public health, while developing 
countries spend slightly over one percent of their GNP on this 
expense. IS By comparison, Thailand allocated approximately six 
percent to health expenditures in 1989.19 This high figure suggests 
that Thailand is undergoing a transformation from a Third World 
nation to a Newly Industrialized Country (NIC).20 As such, Thailand 
can no longer use its public health concerns to justify its reliance 
on safety nets such as compulsory licensing and pipeline protec-
tion. 21 
Because the United States is Thailand's second largest supplier 
of goods and its largest export market, maintaining a conflict-free 
17 See White, supra note 8, at 25. 
18 See Nancy E. Pirt, Regulation of Export of Pharmaceuticals to Developing Countries, 25 DUQ. 
L. REv. 255, 271 (1987). In 1991 the United States spent 12.2% of GNP on health care with 
under 1 % allocated to the purchase of prescription drugs. PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS 
ASSOCIATION, 1992 ANNUAL REpORT 6 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 PMA ANNUAL REpORT]. 
19 Country: Thailand, Kaleidoscope: Current World Data, Aug. 21, 1992, available in 
LEXIS, Intnew Library, Kcwd File. 
20 Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are among the Asian NICs. JONATHAN RIGG, SOUTH-
EAST ASIA: A REGION IN TRANSITION 185 (1991). Third World countries have underdeveloped 
but growing economies and low per capita incomes. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DICTIONARY 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE LIBRARY 69 (2d ed. 1980). NICs enjoy rapid economic growth 
and may be described as "middle income countries." Id. at 51. They are large importers of 
products from developed countries and increase their imports more rapidly than their 
exports. Id. 
Characteristic of an NIC, Thailand has an export-oriented development strategy, diver-
sified manufactured exports, and rapid growth. See RIGG, supra, at 203. Thailand, however, 
continues to face obstacles to obtaining NIC status such as its large, poor agricultural pop-
ulation which it must integrate into its industrial economy. Id. Thailand also suffers from a 
"low quality of industrial entrepreneurship and absence of a coherent government policy to 
promote industrialization." Id. 
21 See Into Bo Champon, The Next "Little Tiger": Manufacturing and Intellectual Property 
Rights in Thailand, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 275,318 (1990). 
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relationship with the United States is essential to Thailand's contin-
ued success.22 Thailand's transition to a new stage of development 
demands changes in its domestic laws and economic priorities. Rec-
ognizing that its economic prosperity depends on relieving trade 
tensions with the United States, the Thai government took steps to 
protect pharmaceutical patents. On February 27, 1992, despite pro-
tests from students and local drug companies, Thailand approved 
amendments to its Patent Act. 23 The United States and especially 
the United States pharmaceutical industry, however, are not com-
pletely satisfied with compulsory licensing provisions and the lack 
of pipeline protection.24 
The 1992 amendments to the Thai Patent Act are an attempt 
by the Thai government to improve strained relations with the 
United States over this trade-related intellectual property issue. 
Thailand's action may represent its desire to become a more signif-
icant actor in the international arena. This result, however, is largely 
attributable to bilateral United States pressure tactics.25 Problematic 
issues still exist which may render the Thai initiative ineffective 
from the perspective of United States research-based pharmaceu-
tical companies.26 Further concessions requested by the United 
States place the Thai government in a very undesirable position: 
the United States threatens trade retaliation while Thai society and 
local industry criticize their government for its acquiescence to 
United States' demands. 
This Note focuses on Thailand's continued resistance to grant-
ing comprehensive patent protection to pharmaceutical products in 
light of Thailand's economic development and the changing global 
marketplace. In part II, this Note will compare the pharmaceutical 
industries of the United States and Thailand. Part III will highlight 
the scope and administration of the Thai Patent Act. Part IV will 
22 See 1992 FET, supra note 11, at 7-8. The United States also has close security ties with 
Thailand. Many United States aid programs provide Thai military personnel with Interna-
tional Military Education Training, which exposes them to democratic values. See HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION REPORTS, SIX-STEPS TO IMPROVE U.S.-THAI RELATIONS, Backgrounder No. 112, 
Apr. 9, 1991. 
25 Thai Patent Act, B.E. 2535 (1992) [Thai Patent Act]. 
24 Letter from Harvey Bale, Jr., PMA Senior Vice President, International, Summary of 
PMA Objections to The Thai Patent Act, B.E. 2535 (1992), to M. Pascal Learedini, Juridical 
Counsel of European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries' Associations (july 24, 1992). 
(copy on file with the Boston College Third World Law Journal) [hereinafter Summary of PMA 
Objections to The Thai Patent Act]. 
25 See infra part V.A. 
26 Summary of PMA Objections to The Thai Patent Act, supra note 24. 
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explore whether Thailand's political and economic situation is ca-
pable of supporting Patent Act reforms without traditional safety 
nets. This section will also discuss the benefits of patent protection 
for Thailand. Part V will discuss the effectiveness of bilateral and 
multilateral attempts to change a developing country's domestic 
laws. Part VI will consider the potential effectiveness of including 
international patent protection discussions in the emerging trend 
of free trade areas. This Note concludes in part VII that although 
the bilateral efforts of the United States have successfully challenged 
Thailand to grant patent protection to pharmaceutical products by 
amending its Patent Act, long-term effects of this change depend 
on domestic forces within Thailand. Although Thailand has legiti-
mate public health concerns, it is at a stage of development where 
it must accept the challenge of becoming an innovator, not an 
imitator. 
II. COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAI 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES 
A. The United States Research-Based Pharmaceutical Industry 
The United States research-based pharmaceutical industry 
boasts a healthy and competitive track record, as it is the world's 
largest producer of drugs. 27 Because foreign sales of United States-
based companies comprise 43.8% of total sales,28 the continued 
growth of this industry depends on overseas sales performance.29 
In 1990, twenty Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA)30 
companies directly invested in the local economy and accounted for 
fourteen percent of the $540 million Thai pharmaceutical market.31 
27 See 1992 PMA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 18; Pirt, supra note 18, at 266. 
28 Gerald J. Mossinghoff, PMA's Three Major Areas of Focus, Address before the Phar-
maceutical Manufacturers Association Annual Meeting (Apr. 29-30, 1991), in AMERICA'S 
PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY: AN ASSESSMENT BY ITS LEADERSHIP 39 1992 [herein-
after Mossinghoff Speech]. 
29 See Petition for Relief Pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 
Refusal by The Government of Thailand to Provide Adequate and Effective Protection of 
Patents for Pharmaceutical Products 6 (Submitted by PMA to the United States Trade 
Representative on Jan. 30, 1991, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1988)) [hereinafter 1991 
PMA Petition]. 
30 "PMA is a non-profit trade association of over 100 research-based pharmaceutical 
companies. These firms produce most of the ethical pharmaceuticals sold in the U.S. and a 
substantial portion of the world supply." 1989-1991 PMA ANNUAL SURVEY REPORT 3 (1991) 
[hereinafter 1989-1991 PMA ANNUAL SURVEY]. 
31 1991 PMA Petition, supra note 29, at 6-7. 
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The structure ofthe United States pharmaceutical industry explains 
MNCs' small share of the lucrative Thai pharmaceutical market. 
PM A's current president, Gerald J. Mossinghoff, explains that 
"[t]here are two kinds of pharmaceutical companies: research-based 
companies and imitators that do not carry out substantial research 
on their own but profit from the fruits of the research of others."32 
Patent protection is necessary to provide the incentive for the enor-
mous financial investment in the R&D of new drugs.33 Only a frac-
tion of the expended resources results in commercially successful 
products because "[m]ost compounds ... ultimately are shelved and 
reap no profits whatsoever for the inventors."34 Thus, original inves-
tors assume the initial risk of marketing an unsuccessful product 
and of losing revenues from otherwise profitable technological de-
velopments.35 Thai imitator companies, which have operations only 
within Thailand, take advantage of this situation by producing only 
successful drugs-those with low risk and with extremely low pro-
duction COSt. 36 The United States pharmaceutical industry is in the 
32 See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The Need for Im-
proved Patent Protection Worldwide 2 J.L. & TECH. 307 (1987). 
33 Id. at 307-308. A "product" patent provides the highest level of protection because it 
"protect[s] a generic or specific chemical structure defining either a group of related chemical 
compounds or a specific chemical compound." Id. at 311. A "process" patent is the least 
desirable for pharmaceutical products because it protects only the steps used to create the 
final product. Id. Proving infringement of a patented process is almost impossible because 
many different processes can result in the same product. Id. A "composition" patent protects 
a chemical formula with one or more active ingredients and at least one surface active agent 
carrier. Id. Preparation or sale of the formula constitutes infringement; mere manufacture 
of the active ingredient does not. Id. 
34 1991 PMA Petition, supra note 29, at 9. The large amount of R&D expenses is primarily 
attributable to the expensive and lengthy New Drug Approval Process (NDA). The average 
drug company spends approximately $231 million over ten to twelve years on researching, 
testing, and developing a pharmaceutical product for public consumption. See id. at 8. A 
NDA submitted to the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires scientific 
data showing the results of safety tests and demonstrating substantial evidence of the new 
drug's effectiveness. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (1992). A 1991 study by the Special Work Group of 
the President's Council on Competitiveness reveals that the NDA required 5.7 years of human 
clinical trials and 2.8 years of regulatory review per new product at the FDA. See Mossinghoff 
Speech, supra note 28, at 37. This time expenditure intensifies competition in the international 
arena because other countries are able to approve new products more quickly. For example, 
the same study indicates that medically sophisticated countries, on average, require only 3.9 
years for clinical trials and 1.1 years for regulatory review. Id. 
35 Charles P. Wallace, The Frustrating Campaign to Stop Thai Drug Copying, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 3,1990, at D1. The Thai Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association estimates that there 
are III local manufacturers producing drugs without a license. Id. at D3. This scenario has 
plagued Smith, Kline & French (Thailand) Ltd., the local subsidiary of the United States 
drug maker. The company claims that it has lost four-fifths of the market for ulcer drugs 
because of manufacturers imitating its patented chemical ingredient, cimetidine, which is in 
the popular drug "tagamet." Id. 
36 See Mossinghoff, supra note 32, at 308. 
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difficult position of balancing the need to be competitive in a global 
market with the adverse effects of rising drug costsY Infringement 
upon United States drug patents leads to a decrease in the benefits 
flowing from new technology to the public. 38 
B. Thailand's Pharmaceutical Industry 
The government-run Government Pharmaceutical Organiza-
tion (GPO) dominates the local Thai pharmaceutical industry, in-
cluding private companies.39 The Thai government maintains its 
position in the pharmaceutical market in order to implement pro-
tectionist policies. For example, not only does the GPO control the 
supply of medicines on the Ministry of Health's essential drugs list 
for government facilities such as hospitals run by the Ministry, but 
it also purchases fifty percent of the pharmaceutical products on 
the essential drugs list from private companies.40 Drugs produced 
37 Development and marketing expenses contribute to why pharmaceuticals from the 
United States sell at approximately thirty times the price of pharmaceuticals produced by 
Thai copycats. See Wallace, supra note 35, at D3. Thailand, however, claims that it pays 
extremely high prices for drugs such as penicillin, developed many years ago. Arup Banerji, 
Bush Takes on Third World Piracies, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1991, § 3, at 11. 
38 See Marshall A. Leafier, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New 
Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 277 (1991). Without the incentive of pharmaceutical 
patent protection, a study estimated that "sixty-five percent of drugs would not have been 
introduced and sixty percent would not have been developed." See 1991 PMA Petition, supra 
note 29, at 9 n.l4. The possible health impact of non protection is substantial: a 1989 study 
by Batelle estimated that pharmaceuticals saved 1.6 million lives and eliminated $141 billion 
in costs associated with society's management of disease related expenses. See Richard J. 
Kogan, Public Policy and Pharmaceutical Progress: Understanding Innovation's Value, Ad-
dress before the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association Annual Meeting (Apr. 29-30, 
1991), in AMERICA'S PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY: AN ASSESSMENT BY ITS LEADER-
SHIP 21 (1992). The Batelle study focused on four diseases (tuberculosis, polio, coronary 
heart disease, and cerebrovascular disease) from 1940 to 1990. Although the study does not 
address Thailand's health situation, it can be inferred that Thailand would benefit similarly 
from protecting pharmaceutical patents. Thailand currently faces a rapid expansion in the 
heterosexual acquisition and transmission of the HIV virus. Marsha F. Goldstein, Rapid Spread 
of Pandemic in Asia Dismays Experts, Spurs Efforts to Fight Transmission, 266 JAMA 1048 (1991). 
In 1991 seventy-seven medicines and vaccines to treat AIDS and related disorders were in 
the developmental pipeline. PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, 1991 ANNUAL 
REPORT 5 (1991). A potentially devastating effect of Thailand's patent policy is that life saving 
medication will not be available to the public because of MNCs' fear of imitators. 
39 Attachment to Mar. 6, 1992 letter from Roger Brooks, Assistant Vice President of 
PMA International Division, to David Walters, Chief Economist, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, THE THAI PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET 1 (Background Paper, undated) [here-
inafter THAI PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET]. In 1990 there were 290 private firms registered in 
Thailand, of which ten percent were subsidiaries of MNCs. Id. Of the 261 domestically-
owned companies, 190 had local manufacturing facilities which produced seventy percent of 
Thailand's pharmaceutical needs. Id. 
4°Id. Public hospitals must spend eighty percent of their pharmaceutical budget on 
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by foreign manufacturers cannot compete with the low prices of-
fered by local manufacturers who pirate foreign products. Although 
there is no official government control of drug prices, the internal 
structure of the Thai government places a ceiling on drug prices 
which discourages foreign manufacturers from entering the Thai 
market.41 
Another example of protectionism is the Thai government's 
control over import procedures. Foreign importers of pharmaceu-
ticals must apply to the Thai Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
for import licenses.42 Pharmaceutical MNCs must provide the Thai 
FDA with pharmalogical and toxilogical data, clinical studies, or a 
certified statement that the drug has been accepted for sale in a 
developed country.43 In contrast, Thai generic producers have no 
requirement to submit this additional data.44 Pharmaceutical MNCs 
oppose this regulatory procedure because "th[e] formula often leaks 
out to Thai producers before marketing approval is granted to the 
foreign firm," thereby allowing copycats the opportunity to exploit 
a new drug.45 Moreover, there is a thirty-three percent duty on all 
imported pharmaceuticals.46 The registration process requires at 
least three months and can take up to one year to complete.47 These 
requirements effectively reduce the incentives for foreign manu-
facturers to export pharmaceutical products to Thailand. 
III. THAILAND'S PATENT LAW 
A. Scope and Administration of the Thai Patent Act 
The newly amended Thai Patent Act provides a twenty-year 
patent term to pharmaceutical products.48 As in the United States, 
products from the essential drugs list which are exempted from burdensome governmental 
registration procedures. Id. 
41 Id. 
42 See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS 
AND MEANS, STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON 
FINANCE, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS., COUNTRY REpORTS ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE PRAC-
TICES 169 (Jt. Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter 1991 COUNTRY REPORTS]' 
43 White, supra note 8, at 25. 
44 [d. 
45 See Williams, supra note 5, § 4, at 9. United States companies also claim that Thai 
producers often sign joint venture agreements and subsequently renege as soon as United 
States companies deliver the drug formulas. Id. 
46 THAI PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET, supra note 39, at 3. 
47 1991 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 42, at 169. 
48 Thai Patent Act, supra note 23, § 35. The previous patent law did not protect phar-
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Thailand has a "first-to-invent" patent system.49 Any invention 
which is publicized outside Thailand by the inventor or displayed 
at an exhibition within twelve months before its application for 
patent is eligible for protection.50 The amended Patent Act, how-
ever, does not provide retroactive protection for products that have 
been patented elsewhere.5l Pipeline protection-protecting phar-
maceuticals which are invented, but not yet on the market-is also 
lacking. Pipeline protection is very important to the United States 
pharmaceutical industry because the licensing procedure in Thai-
land can take years. 52 
Section 55 of the newly amended Patent Act contains one of 
the most significant changes. Section 55 creates a Board of Phar-
maceutical Patents (Board) which has three main functions: (1) to 
compare prices of patented to non-patented pharmaceutical prod-
ucts;53 (2) to advise the Cabinet on policy issues affecting pharma-
ceutical patents;54 and (3) to formulate the structure for financial 
support of R&D of pharmaceutical products. 55 Applicants granted 
patents must provide specific information about pricing,56 produc-
tion and distribution costs, 57 and licensees of the pharmaceutical 
patent or pharmaceutical processes or ingredients. 58 The Board also 
has the "power to summon the patentee, the licensee, or any other 
person to present facts or opinions, or deliver any additional doc-
maceutical patents. Thai Patent Act, B.E. 2522 (1979), §§ 9, 35, reprinted in 82 PAT. & 
TRADEMARK REV. 278 (1984) (copy on file with the Boston College Third World Law Journal) 
[hereinafter 1979 Thai Patent Act]. 
49 Compare Thai Patent Act, supra note 23, § 5 (a patentable invention must be new, 
useful, and constitute an inventive step), with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) ("whoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent ... "). 
50 Thai Patent Act, supra note 23, §§ 19, 19 bis. The 1979 Thai Patent Act, supra note 
48, § 6(5), previously gave inventors only 180 days to file a patent application if they desired 
to have the filing date as the opening date of the exhibition. 
51 Thai Patent Act, supra note 23, § 6(3) provides: 
An invention is new if it does not form part of the state of the art. The state of the 
art also includes any of the following inventions: 
(3) an invention patented in this or a foreign country prior to the date of the patent 
application. 
52 See infra part II.B. 
53 Thai Patent Act, supra note 23, § 55 quartre (1). 
54 [d. § 55 quartre (3). 
55 [d. § 55 quartre (4). 
56 [d. § 55 bis (1). 
57/d. § 55 bis (2). 
58 [d. § 55 bis (3). 
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uments or items."59 Those who do not provide this specific infor-
mation may be required to pay a fine, face incarceration, or both.60 
The Board provisions, however, do not refer to any schedule 
for price monitoring. Presumably, the Board has unlimited discre-
tion to solicit information from companies. This arrangement can 
only foster hostility between MNCs and the Thai government. 
These provisions, therefore, do not create incentives to file patent 
applications for pharmaceutical products in Thailand. 
B. Compulsory Licensing 
Like other developing countries, Thailand significantly curbs 
patent protection with broad compulsory licensing provisions.61 A 
compulsory license authorizes a person to use the patented product 
without obtaining the patentee's approva1.62 Developing countries 
use compulsory licensing to assure that their citizens benefit from 
foreign patented products. 
Compulsory licensing is one of the most significant obstacles to 
comprehensive patent protection in Thailand. A license may be 
granted if the patented product has not been produced63 or sold in 
Thailand, or is sold at an unreasonably high price or in insufficient 
quantities to meet public demand.64 Therefore, a person may in-
fringe upon an existing patented invention if it can be shown that 
the use of the invention does not seriously harm the rights of the 
original patentee and that the product is important to commerce in 
Thailand.65 Even if no one applies for a license, the Director-Gen-
eral has the authority to order an investigation regarding the disuse 
or high prices of the patented product.66 Upon the publication of 
a violation, any person may apply for a license.67 The compulsory 
licensing provisions in the Thai Patent Act are, in essence, a loop-
59Id. § 55 quartre (4). 
60 Id. § 83 bis. 
61 United States patent law does not have compulsory licensing provisions. By contrast, 
in Argentina "a patent will lapse within two years of grant if the invention is not worked, or 
if working is interrupted for two years." Mossinghoff, supra note 32, at 313. 
62Id. at 312. 
6. Thai Patent Act, supra note 23, § 46(1). 
64 Id. § 46(2). 
65 In either scenario of nonproduction or unreasonable price, the licensee applicant must 
set forth that he has tried to obtain permission from the patentee by proposing appropriate 
conditions and compensation, but that no appropriate agreement can be reached in an 
appropriate period of time. Id. § 46. 
66 Id. § 46 bis. 
67Id. 
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hole around the exclusivity of a patent. These provisions, theoret-
ically, could be used to withdraw patent protection at any time. 
In order to avoid compulsory licensing, the manufacturer of 
the patented product must "work" the invention to infuse capital 
into the host country.68 "Working" means commercially exploiting 
an invention so that the public has access to the patented product; 
importing a product is not working.69 If the patentee does not 
comply with the "working" requirement within three years of the 
patent grant or four years after the date of the patent application, 
compulsory licensing becomes available to imitator companies.70 
Two years of non-working results in a revocation of the patent. 71 
Pharmaceutical MNCs often object to working requirements be-
cause it is "technically and economically impractical to build a so-
phisticated chemical manufacturing plant in each nation in which a 
manufacturer markets a product."72 Because the pharmaceutical 
industry requires technical expertise and a highly educated work 
force, the working requirement significantly hinders the twenty year 
grant of patent exclusivity, as it may not be feasible to introduce 
this type of operation in Thailand within a short period of time. 
C. Enforcement Mechanisms 
The newly amended Thai Patent Act significantly changes the 
enforcement mechanisms provided in the 1979 Patent Act. Under 
the 1979 Patent Act, the patentee did not have a right to initiate a 
civil action in court. 73 MNCs were in the uncomfortable position of 
relying on the Thai government to institute an action against a 
patent infringer.74 A patent holder had to make a motion to a Thai 
court to join the public prosecutor as a joint prosecutor before the 
court could make a judgment.75 This restriction no longer applies 
as Section 10 of the Thai Patent Act now provides that where the 
name of the inventor is registered, the patentee may sue a violator 
68 See id. § 46. 
69 See Mossinghoff, supra note 32, at 312 n.17. 
70 See Thai Patent Act, supra note 23, § 46. 
71 [d. § 55. Section 55 of the 1979 Patent Act, supra note 48, previously allowed six years 
before the patent could be cancelled on grounds of nonworking. 
72 Mossinghoff, supra note 32, at 312. 
73 Robert J. Patch, Operating Under the New Patent Act, EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Dec. 
IS, 1979, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Easian File. 
74 See Champon, supra note 21, at 321. 
75 [d. 
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of a patent right. 76 If the patentee has proof that the defendant's 
product shares similar characteristics as the patentee's, the amended 
law presumes that the defendant stole the patentee's idea.77 The 
defendant must rebut the presumption. 
Another change is that once there is clear evidence of a viola-
tion, the patentee can request the court to grant a restraining order 
against the offender.78 The court also has the power to order dam-
ages paid to the infringed patentee.79 Unlike United States patent 
law, which is a civil statute in its entirety with civil penalties, the 
Thai Patent Act is a civil code with both civil and criminal penalty 
provisions. 8o A person who infringes upon a patentee's exclusive 
rights faces imprisonment, fines, or both.8l 
These enforcement mechanisms appear at first to provide 
strong incentives for pharmaceutical MNCs to apply for patent 
protection in Thailand. The effectiveness of these provisions, how-
ever, is not self-evident. First, there is no statutorily defined amount 
of damages. It may be, as before, that the cost of pursuing damages 
outweighs any nominal benefits achieved. Second, foreign patent 
holders remain at the mercy of a Thai court, which may be partial 
to domestic interests. Because of political sensitivity of pharmaceu-
tical patents, it is unlikely that pharmaceutical MNCs can rely on 
Thailand's system to protect foreign inventions. 
IV. THAILAND'S ABILITY TO SUPPORT PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT 
PROTECTION 
Because patent protection involves seemingly incompatible eco-
nomic and public health issues, an inquiry into Thailand's ability to 
support stronger patent legislation is necessary. Legal protection 
afforded by the Thai Patent Act is merely one aspect regarding the 
feasibility of persuading Thailand to protect foreign patents.82 Po-
litical stability as related to economic conditions is a significant fac-
tor.83 If Thailand wants to attract investors and increase trade ties 
76 Thai Patent Act, supra note 23, § 10. 
77 [d. § 77. 
78 [d. § 77 bis. 
79 [d. § 77 trio 
80 See id. §§ 77, 85. 
81 [d. § 85. 
82 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 
1991, at 192, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TRD/ll, U.N. Sales No. E.91.II.D.15 (1991) [hereinafter 
1991 UNCTAD REpORT]. 
83 See id. 
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with developed nations, it cannot continue its history of political 
turbulence. Intellectual property is an area where the disciplines of 
law and economics intersect.84 As such, economic conditions in Thai-
land play an important role in whether the Thai Patent Act will 
successfully protect foreign MNCs' R&D expenditures. The amend-
ments do not require the Thai domestic industry to significantly 
decrease their dependence on foreign technology. The patent issue, 
therefore, continues to challenge Thailand to stimulate its own 
social, economic, and technological progress in order to become a 
stronger, more industrialized nation. 
A. Thailand's Political Instability 
Thailand's military has dominated the country's history of po-
litical turbulence. In 1932, a group of young intellectuals and the 
military overthrew the absolute monarchy, then known as Siam, and 
established a constitutional monarchy.85 King Bhumibol Adulyadej 
is the Head of State and the symbolic Head of the Armed Forces.86 
As such, the King is the most respected figure in Thailand and 
provides a unifying influence.87 Despite this factor, military domi-
nance in Thai politics continues to threaten political stability. 
On February 23, 1991, the Royal Thai army peacefully over-
threw the democratically-elected Chatichai Choonhaven administra-
tion in Thailand's seventeenth military coup since 1932.88 The first 
84 ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 647 
(1990). 
85 Keith D. Suter, Thailand: The Fifth Asian Tiger, CONTEMP. REV., Mar. 1991, at 120-21. 
The Thai political system has three branches: legislative (National Assembly), executive 
(Cabinet), and judicial (Courts). GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THAILAND 76 (Somsakdi Xuto 
ed., 1987). 
86 GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THAILAND, supra note 85, at 58. 
87Id. at 122. 
88 After Thailand's Coup, It's Business as Usual for Most Projects, Bus. ASIA, Mar. 4, 1991, at 
69 [hereinafter Business as Usual]. Government corruption triggered the downfall of Chati-
chai's administration and is a constant threat to MNCs that desire to import or manufacture 
drugs in Thailand. Requesting the Thai government to protect foreign patents is a difficult 
task, as many Thai legislators hold stakes in local drug companies. White, supra note 8, at 
25. 
The coup leaders quickly installed the National Peacekeeping Council (NPC) which 
appointed Anand Panyarachun as the interim Prime Minister and drafted an interim con-
stitution. THAI INTERIM CONST. art. 18 (Mar. 1, 1991) (copy on file with the Boston College 
Third World Law Journal). Despite protests by students, academics, and other pro-democracy 
groups, the King promulgated a new constitution into law on December 9, 1991. THAI 
CONST. (Dec. 9, 1991) (copy on file with the Boston College Third World Law Journal). The new 
constitution provides that military leaders are prohibited from concurrently holding future 
cabinet posts. Id. ch.7, art. 162. 
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general elections since the coup were held on March 22, 1992. 
Three pro-military parties won 190, or fifty-three percent, of the 
360 seats in the Lower House of Parliament.89 On April 7, 1992, 
five pro-military parties appointed General Suchinda Kraprayoon, 
Thailand's top military commander, as Thailand's Prime Minister.9o 
Suchinda's appointment ignited the bloodiest civilian upheaval in 
Thailand's history. On May 19, 1992, the Thai army began the 
"four nights of fury" against unarmed pro-democracy demonstra-
tors, killing and wounding many of those voicing their dissatisfac-
tion with military rule. 91 
On May 21, 1992, the King intervened in the unrest.92 Suchinda 
resigned on May 24, 1992, after losing his political support.93 The 
King then re-appointed Anand Panyarachun as an interim Prime 
Minister to restore balance until the September elections.94 On Sep-
89 Philip Shenon, Elections in Thailand Help Raise Military's Power in Government, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1992, at A9. The Lower House of Parliament is an elected body. THAI 
CaNST., supra note 88, ch.6, pt.3, art. 99. The Senate has 270 members who are appointed 
by the King. Id. ch.6, pt.2, art. 94. 
90 Philip Shenon, Thailand's Military Chief Appointed to Prime Minister's Post, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 8, 1992, at A9. Mr. Narong Wongwan, an elected legislator with ties to the military 
junta, had previously been selected to be the Prime Minister of the five-party coalition 
government. Philip Shenon, U.S. Links New Thai Leader to Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1992, 
at A3. On April 5, 1992, Narong withdrew himself from consideration after the United 
States State Department indicated that his visa request had been denied because of drug 
trafficking suspicions. See Shenon, supra, at A9. Suchinda later appointed Narong as one of 
the deputy Prime Ministers in the new government. Charles P. Wallace, Thai Barred by U.S. 
Given Post in New Government, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1992, at A9. 
91 Philip Shenon, Deaths Mount as Troops Fire on Thais, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1992, at AI, 
A4. Unlike anti-government protests in 1973, these demonstrators had broad support from 
students, laborers, and businessmen. Id. 
92 Charles P. Wallace, Thai King Intervenes to Help End Turmoil, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1992, 
at A12; see William Branigan, Thai King Walks Tightrope between Public, Private Roles, WASH. 
POST, May 30, 1992, at A13. 
9. Philip Shenon, Thailand's Premier Quits Over Unrest, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1992, at 1. At 
the time of Suchinda's resignation, over 400 persons were reported as missing. Id. The King 
issued a royal pardon preventing the prosecution of Suchinda and others involved in the 
military intervention. Id. at 5. On July 22, 1992, a Thai constitutional tribunal upheld the 
royal pardon. Thai Tribunal Backs Amnesty Decree Covering May Unrest, UPI, July 22, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPST90 File. 
94 Philip Shenon, A Former Thai Premier, No Ally of Military, Regains His Old Post, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 1992, at A5. In an effort to curb military influence in politics, Anand 
appointed businessmen and civil servants to his Cabinet. New Thai Chief Forms Cabinet Like 
His Last, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1992, at A3. Anand also ousted the Supreme Military Com-
mander and army chief from their posts, removed military officials from the boardrooms of 
state-run corporations, and ended the military'S control of the television system. Philip 
Shenon, Thai Premier Bears Down on Military for Killing of Pro-Democracy Civilians, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 4, 1992, at A6. On June 29, 1992, the House dissolved the junta's NPC as a symbolic 
gesture. Parliament Advocates Dissolution of National Peace-keeping Force, BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, July 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Report Library, BBCSWB File. 
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tember 11, 1992, the King responded to the pro-democracy dem-
onstrators' demand and signed a constitutional amendment into law 
that requires future prime ministers to be elected representatives.95 
Despite prediction of strong public sentiment to repudiate military 
dominance in politics, the September 13, 1992 general election did 
not yield an overwhelming yictory for anti-military parties, as pro-
democracy parties won only fifty-one percent of the contested par-
liamentary seats.96 On September 23, 1992, Chuan Leekpai of the 
Democratic Party was named Thailand's twentieth prime minister. 97 
Political stability and a dedicated effort by the Thai government 
to protect pharmaceuticals are paramount to foreign investment in 
Thailand.98 Tensions between pro-democracy and traditional mili-
tary rule create a sensitive political situation for potential foreign 
investors. Revising the Thai Patent Act to exclude compulsory li-
censing and other onerous provisions depends on whether the fu-
ture Thai government can withstand public pressure long enough 
to realize the long-term benefits of patent protection. The pro-
95 Pranee Srithongnoy, Law Passed to Ensure Thai Prime Ministers are Elected, UPI, Sept. 
11, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPST90 File. 
96 Philip Shenon, Thai Anti-Military Parties Hope to Rule as a Coalition, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
14, 1992, at A3. 
97 Philip Shenon, Opponent of Military Dominance Named Thailand's Prime Minister, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1992, at A8. 
98 Dr. Valvudhi, manager of a local drug company has summarized the political process: 
First we have to have a committee to draft a law, then it has to be reviewed by many 
more committees, then the cabinet has to look at it, then it has to go to Parliament 
for them to think about, and then maybe Parliament gets dissolved and we start all 
over again. 
White, supra note 8, at 25. Thailand's past attempts at reforming the Patent Act have been 
mere stalling tactics. In May 1989, Thailand proposed a two-year monitoring system as an 
interim measure which would have prohibited the marketing of generic copies of pharma-
ceuticals from the day a new drug is registered on the Thai market until the Thai FDA 
approved its sale. Compromise Hoped for on Drug Patent Regulations, PHARMACEUTICAL Bus. 
NEWS, May 12, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Pbnws File. This measure which 
would have protected a foreign drug manufacturer's position during the specified period 
should have been effective by October 1, 1989, but had not even been introduced to the 
National Assembly by that date. Thai Pharmaceutical Patent Problem Reaches Impasse, PHARMA-
CEUTICAL Bus. NEWS, Feb. 16, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Pbnws File. Another 
instance of stalling occurred when a patent protection bill was pushed through the National 
Assembly on July 12, 1990. Transformation for Thailand's Pharmaceutical Industry, PHARMACEU-
TICAL Bus. NEWS, Aug. 17, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Pbnws File. This bill 
would have allowed foreign companies to bypass the Thai FDA, to establish majority con-
trolled joint venture companies involved in R&D, and to receive tax breaks for ten years.Id. 
This policy change, however, was never implemented, as opposition ministers who had been 
"tricked" into voting for this bill dismantled the legislation. PMA Slams Thai Government's 
Patent Protection, PHARMACEUTICAL Bus. NEWS, Feb. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, Pbnws File. 
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democracy Prime Minister will hopefully recognize Thailand's need 
to "playa role in the world economic structure commensurate with 
its industrial diversification and growing economic importance."99 
B. Economic Considerations of Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in 
Thailand 
1. Arguments Against Implementing Patent Protection in 
Developing Countries 
Calculations concerning the value of protecting an intellectual 
property right utilize a costlbenefit analysis. 100 Developing nations 
are concerned primarily with development. 101 Therefore, those who 
oppose patent protection in these nations often assume that imitat-
ing products without an inventor's permission is a necessary first 
stage of development. 102 
Opponents argue that the costs of implementing a patent sys-
tem are too prohibitive for a developing country to grant patent 
protection because the country does not necessarily receive eco-
nomic benefits. Developing countries fear a form of "technological 
colonialism" where their economic development is dependent on 
monopolistic MNCs.103 Critics argue that past efforts to transfer 
technology to developing countries have done little to advance tech-
nological capacity.104 While developing countries may have greater 
access to inventions, they do not possess the technical or human 
resource capacities necessary to implement the new technology.l05 
Opponents argue that there is no correlation between R&D expen-
99 1992 FET, supra note 11, at 7. 
100 See RICHARD T. RApp & RICHARD P. ROZEK, BENEFITS AND COSTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper No.3, 1990) (emphasis on pharmaceutical patents); Samuel Oddi, The Inter-
national Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.j., 831, 837-
55 (1987) (discussing many types of patents). This section focuses on the current debate 
concerning international patent protection, with emphasis on pharmaceutical product patent 
protection. 
101 Oddi, supra note 100, at 843. 
102 SHERWOOD, supra note 84, at 166. 
103 David M. Haug, Note, The International Transfer of Technology: Lessons that East Europe 
Can Leamfrom the Failed Third World Experience, 5 HARVARD j.L. & TECH., 209, 218 (1992). 
104 Id. at 213, 218. Technology transfers include licensing technology, patent disclosures, 
publications or technical meetings, the hiring employees of innovating firms, the reverse 
engineering of a product, and independent R&D. RApp & ROZEK, supra note 100, at 4. These 
programs traditionally have been implemented through private party contracts with minimal 
governmental interference. Haug, supra note 103, at 222-23. 
105 Oddi, supra note 100, at 851-52. 
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ditures and the need for patent protection in developing countries 
because these costs are recovered largely in the markets of devel-
oped countries. 106 From a developing country's perspective, admin-
istrative costs, which are already burdensome, would also place 
barriers to an efficient patent system. 107 The consumer in the de-
veloping country would therefore bear the inequities of a patent 
system through higher prices. 
2. Arguments Favoring the Implementation of Patent Protection 
in Developing Countries 
Proponents of patent protection in developing countries believe 
that legal protection of patents is directly related to improved eco-
nomic growth. lOB In the area of pharmaceutical patents, the overall 
benefits are improved public health and increased technological 
capacity. 109 
Proponents argue that patent protection provides an economic 
incentive to MNCs to participate in technology transfers. llo Ex-
changing the grant of an exclusive right in return for the disclosure 
of details of an invention satisfies mutual needs: MNCs reap finan-
cial rewards which in turn fund future R&D, and developing coun-
tries gain access to new technology. 1 1 1 Proponents argue that the 
disclosure of advance technical information forces domestic indus-
tries in developing countries to generate their own improved prod-
ucts instead of imitating foreign inventions.ll2 Growth of R&D fa-
cilities abroad also benefits the developing country's economy by 
creating employment opportunities. ll3 These developments there-
fore will result in lessened economic dependence, that is, a stronger 
human resource and technological infrastructure. 1l4 Proponents of 
106 See 1991 UNCTAD REpORT, supra note 82, at 192. 
107 Oddi, supra note 100, at 846-48. 
108 See RApp & ROZEK, supra note 100, at 39. 
109Id. 
II°Id. at 14-17; Champon, supra note 21, at 330. 
III See RApp & ROZEK, supra note 100, at 15-16. 
112Id. at 15. As evidenced by western european countries, a significant benefit of stronger 
patent laws is increased economic development through the infusion of foreign capital. Id. 
at 7. In 1989, pharmaceutical companies spent 67.7% of their total foreign R&D expenditures 
in Western Europe, compared to only 0.5% in the Far East and Pacific regions. See 1989-
1991 PMA ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 30, at 24. Between 1969 and 1989 R&D efforts in 
the European Community have yielded the discovery of 122 new drugs. PMA MEMBER 
COMPANIES' EC SURVEY 4 (1989) (copy on file with the Boston College Third World Law Journal). 
lIS See SHERWOOD, supra note 84, at 173-75. 
114Id. at 173, 191. 
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patent protection also argue that anticipated high prices should not 
result, as the grant of a patent right does not necessarily guarantee 
market share. 115 Costs should actually decrease, as an expanding 
market creates competition through the availability of a choice of 
drugs at various prices. 1l6 Newly patented drugs also compete with 
many drugs from the World Health Organization's (WHO) Essential 
Drug List, many of whose patent lives have expired. ll7 A developing 
country that does not provide patent protection chooses a short-
term approach to economic development that leads to a pattern of 
dependency. I IS 
3. Economic Feasibility and Benefits of Pharmaceutical Patent 
Protection in Thailand 
Economic conditions in Thailand are conducive to granting 
patent protection to pharmaceuticals without the safety nets of com-
pulsory licensing or working requirements. As discussed earlier, 
Thailand is in the enviable position of soon graduating from Third 
World status to become a NIC, and has the modern economy to 
support this upward shift in its global status. 1l9 Despite this eco-
nomic success, however, Thailand's copycat drug industry claims 
that Thailand is not "mature enough for patents."120 Local Thai 
drug manufacturers fear that opening the import market to patent 
owners will result in elevated costs to consumers. 121 Thus, the Thai 
pharmaceutical industry erroneously believes that it must steal tech-
nology of developed countries and discourage the protection of 
115 See RApp & ROZEK, supra note 100, at 39-40. 
116 SHERWOOD, supra note 84, at 161; RApp & ROZEK, supra note 100, at 24-25. 
117 RApp & ROZEK, supra note 100, at 24. The WHO is a 166-member international health 
agency of the United Nations which seeks to obtain the highest level of health care for all 
people. Some of its many projects include: emphasizing health needs of developing countries, 
working towards developing new techniques to effectuate solutions, and establishing stan-
dards for pharmaceutical needs. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATION-INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-
ZATIONS 876 (26th ed. 1992). 
118 As one scholar has noted, "in its pursuit of this cost reduction objective, the country 
has savaged its indigenous technology infrastructure and foregone opportunities to build 
tacit knowledge, human resources and its research base." SHERWOOD, supra note 84, at 166. 
119 See 1992 FET, supra note 11, at 3; Jansen, supra note 10, at 13. In contrast to 
developing countries such as India, Thailand has successfully attracted a large amount of 
foreign investment. In 1991, United States companies invested one billion dollars in Thailand 
while between $150 to $200 million was invested in India. Greater U.S. Investment in South 
Asia Depends on Reform Process, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA), July 29, 1992, at 146. 
120 See White, supra note 8, at 25. 
121 See Oddi, supra note 100, at 847; Williams, supra note 5, § 4, at 9. 
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pharmaceutical patents in order to maintain its rapid economic 
development. 
Pharmaceutical patent protection will force Thailand to emerge 
from its mode of dependency without destroying its domestic drug 
industry. Comprehensive legislation would enable Thailand to ben-
efit from modern drug research. Patent protection will enable safer 
drugs to reach the Thai market because pharmaceutical products 
imported into Thailand from the United States have already met 
the strict United States FDA standard. Thailand currently has lim-
ited means for monitoring safety and, as a result, quality-control 
problems at local drug producers are common. 122 The grant of 
exclusivity accompanied by government enforcement would enable 
pharmaceutical MNCs to feel more secure about marketing their 
safer inventions in Thailand. 123 Future benefits to Thai society 
through the introduction of safe, new, patentable drugs by foreign 
MNCs therefore would respect Thailand's public health concern. 
Another benefit to Thailand will be in the area of technology 
advancement. Advancements in the growing industrial sector are 
in the areas of processing natural resources and import-dependent 
cheap labor products, and not in technology.124 Thailand is also 
heavily dependent on foreign technology in most fields. 125 Because 
Thailand has the technical ability to drive a strong export-oriented 
economy, it should strive to incorporate technological advances. 126 
Thailand has a lucrative pharmaceutical industry that already has 
assembled financing, resources, and manpower. Granting patent 
protection would not put the Thai pharmaceutical industry out of 
business; it would provide an incentive to do more than just imi-
tate. 127 Technology transfer through a grant of patent protection 
will benefit Thailand by propelling it to a new level of economic 
independence. 
Effective patent protection will also result in increased foreign 
investment in Thailand. 128 The attempt of MNCs to establish man-
ufacturing bases in Thailand, however, will not be without obstacles. 
122 See Williams, supra note 5, at 9. 
m See Mossinghoff, supra note 32, at 307. 
124 See Jansen, supra note 10, at 13. 
125ld. at 26. A survey of manufacturing firms in Thailand suggests that companies spend 
only 0.1 % of annual sales on R&D. ld. (figure reflects multi-industry manufacturing, not 
only the pharmaceutical industry). 
126 Contra Oddi, supra note 100, at 843. 
127 See SHERWOOD, supra note 84, at 167. 
128ld. at 192-93. 
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Cheap labor is a motivating factor to MNCs, but Thailand's insuf-
ficiently skilled workforce creates a barrier for pharmaceutical com-
panies to begin large-scale production in a short time period. 129 
Even if the Thai government offers business investment incentives 
and an effective patent system, foreign firms must address Thai-
land's problematic infrastructure, which is developmentally lagging 
behind the needs of its modern exporting ventures. 130 
Within Thailand's domestic situation, political stability would 
enhance Thailand's ability to create and implement an effective 
physical and technological infrastructure plan which is necessary to 
support new industries drawn to Thailand's multinational, business-
oriented environment. 131 Tensions from the high administrative 
cost of a patent system must also be resolved in favor of patent 
protection. Legal protection alone will not offset the current lack 
of trained personnel and other cost intensive improvements.132 
These challenges, however, should be met to provide better prod-
ucts for consumers and promote economic development. In short, 
a government free from military dominance and instability is nec-
essary for Thailand's continued economic health. 133 As to Thailand's 
patent protection policies, the key to positive change in the present 
patent law is to effectively change the Thai copycat mind set to one 
of innovation. 
V. V.S.-THAI RELATIONS REGARDING PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT 
PROTECTION: THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK 
This section provides a brief overview of V nited States efforts 
to "encourage" Thailand to enact a more aggressive patent law. The 
issue of patent protection in the international arena traditionally 
has been addressed through instruments providing voluntary pre-
scribed standards and concepts. The Paris Convention for the Pro-
tection of Industrial Property, for example, is the governing inter-
129 1992 FET, supra note II, at 6. 
130 Victor Mallet, Grappling with Solutions, FIN. TIMES, May I, 1992, at 33. 
m See CHRIS DIXON, SOUTH EAST ASIA IN THE WORLD-ECONOMY 13 (1991). As Dr. 
Chalongphob, head of macro-economics at the Thailand Development and Research Insti-
tute, stated, "it's now clear that [Thailand's] economic growth outpaced [its] political matu-
rity." Clayton Jones, Thailand's Brief Boom Goes Mushy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 17, 
1992, at 7. 
m 1991 UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 82, at 191. 
'" Nicolas D. Kristof, Thai Unrest Does Harm to Economy, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1992, at 
Dl,D9. 
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national treaty for patent protection. 134 The principle multilateral 
intellectual property organization is the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), which encourages developing nations to par-
ticipate in the international patent system 135 and performs admin-
istrative tasks for the Paris Convention. 136 
The United States no longer considers the Paris Convention to 
be the relevant body to address the modern needs of intellectual 
property owners.137 The Convention's most significant deficiency is 
that it does not provide a minimum level of protection for member 
nations. 138 The lack of effective procedures regarding treaty en-
forcement and dispute settlement are also problematic areas. Thai-
land is not a member nation of the Convention. Thus, the Conven-
tion principles cannot be applied to Thailand. Developing countries 
prefer WIPO as the forum to discuss intellectual property rights 
because they view the issue as a social, not trade, concern. 139 From 
the perspective of the United States, however, WIPO is not com-
petent enough or an important enough actor in the international 
arena to effectuate broad changes in international patent laws. 14o 
134 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,21 U.S.T. 
1630, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. This Convention embodies four main concepts. First, national 
treatment requires member states to grant all the advantages of their domestic law to nationals 
of other countries subscribing to the Convention. Id. art. 2. Second, the right of priority 
provides that a patent holder may file a patent in one member country and wait up to one 
year from the first filing to file in the remaining member countries. Id. art. 4 (A)(1). Third, 
patents have legal independence-the existence of a patentable item is dependent upon the 
laws of the granting state. Id. art. 4 bis (1). Fourth, member states are limited in their ability 
to forfeit patents and may grant compulsory licenses if a foreign manufacturer does not 
"work" the invention. Id. art. 5A. 
195 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 
21 U.S.T. 1748, 828 U.N.T.S. 3. WIPO's position is that patent protection will lead to 
economic development. Id. 
196Id. art. 4(ii). WIPO is currently focusing on creating a Patent Law Harmonization 
Treaty, which would provide central filings for patents to enable international recognition 
of the property right. Jochen Pagenberg, The WIPO Patent Harmonization Treaty, 19 AIPLA 
QUARTERLY J. 1 (1991); Edward G. Fiorito, Harmonization of u.s. and Worldwide Patent Laws, 
JPTOS 82 (1991). 
137 See Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, The U.S. Proposal for a GATT-Agreement on Intellectual 
Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, in lIC STUDIES IN 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW, GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 78 (Freidrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard 
Schricker eds. 1989). 
19S SHERWOOD, supra note 84, at 25. 
139 See Gregory D.L. Morris, GATT Gets Plea From India, CHEMICAL WEEK, Aug. 2, 1989, 
at 14. 
140 See Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 137, at 79-80. Another criticism of WIPO is that 
agreements can be manipulated by nations with little involvement in the global economy, as 
many nations have a greater voting power than their size justifies. See CHRISTOPHER M. 
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The United States therefore has looked towards other mechanisms 
to effectuate changes in Thailand's intellectual property policies. 
A. Special301 
The United States' most effective bilateral initiative to gain 
patent reforms in foreign countries is the Special 301 action which 
is part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
(hereinafter 1988 Trade Act}.141 The goal of Special 301 is to ne-
gotiate improvements in foreign countries' intellectual property sys-
tems through bilateral and/or multilateral initiatives. 142 The United 
States seeks to ensure adequate and effective intellectual property 
protection and equal market access. 143 
Thirty days after submitting the National Trade Estimate144 to 
congressional committees, the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) 145 identifies foreign countries146 and priority foreign 
countries147 that violate United States intellectual property poli-
cies.148 Within thirty days of designating a priority foreign country, 
the USTR must initiate a Section 301 investigation. 149 An investi-
gation can also be triggered by a petition filed on behalf of any 
GACEK, u.s. GOALS FOR PATENT PROTECTION IN THE GATT TRADE TALKS 8 (Heritage Foun-
dation Backgrounder No. 863, 1991). 
141 Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 
U.S.C.). 
142 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(10) (1988). 
143 19 U.S.C. § 2901(a), (b)(1O). For in-depth discussions of Special 301, see Theodore 
H. Davis, Jr., Combating Piracy of Intellectual Property in International Markets: A Proposed Mod-
ification of the Special 301 Action, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505 (1991); Judith H. Bello & 
Alan F. Holmer, Update "Special 301", 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 874 (1990-1991); Judith H. 
Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301": Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13 
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 (1989-1990) [hereinafter 1989-1990 Special 301]. 
144 19 U.S.C. § 2241(b) (1988). 
145 The USTR develops and coordinates the implementation of United States interna-
tional policy under the direction of the President of the United States. Reorg. Plan No.3 of 
1979,44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1381-82 (1988). 
146 A designated foreign country denies adequate and effective means under the law of 
the foreign country for persons who are not citizens or nationals of such foreign country to 
secure, exercise, and enforce rights relating to patents. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(d)(2) (1988). 
147 A priority foreign country has the most egregious practices that deny adequate 
intellectual property protection and have the greatest adverse effect on the relevant products 
ofthe United States. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(I)(AHB). These countries are also not participating 
in good faith negotiations to remedy the inadequate practices. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(I)(C). 
148 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a). 
149 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(A) (1988). The USTR is not required to initiate an investigation 
if it would be detrimental to United States interests. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(B). The USTR 
has further discretion to determine whether an investigation would be effective in addressing 
such act, policy, or practice. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(c). 
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interested person. 150 The USTR must make a determination of 
whether violations have occurred within twelve to eighteen months 
for a regular investigation, 15 I or within six months for a priority 
country.152 while the USTR is required to take action in certain 
circumstances,153 the United States has yet to retaliate against any 
priority country. 
After several failed attempts by the United States to force Thai-
land to amend its Patent Act, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association (PMA) filed a petition to initiate an investigation of 
Thailand's pharmaceutical patent protection. 154 The USTR initiated 
150 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a). 
151 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(2) (1988). 
152 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(3)(A). 
15S The USTR is required to take action if an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country: 
(1) violates the provisions of or denies benefits to the United States under any trade agree-
ment, or (2) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2411(a)(1)(B) (1988). The USTR, however, is not required to take in certain circumstances 
such as when the foreign country has agreed to eliminate the disputed practice or the action 
would have an adverse impact on the United States economy substantially out of proportion 
to the benefits of the action. 19 U.S.C. § 24 11 (a)(2)(B). The USTR has discretion to take 
action upon a determination that "an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is unrea-
sonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States commerce .... " 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2411(b)(1). The USTR has the authority to: 
(A) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, benefits of trade agreement 
concessions ... ; (B) impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of ... 
such foreign country for such time as the Trade Representative determines appro-
priate; or (C) enter into binding agreements with such foreign country that commit 
such foreign country to (i) eliminate, or phase out, the act, policy, or practice that 
is the subject of the action ... , (ii) eliminate any burden or restriction on United 
States commerce resulting from such act, policy, or practice, or ... (iii) provide the 
United States with compensatory trade benefits .... 
19 U.S.C. § 2411(c). 
154 See 1991 PMA Petition, supra note 29. The United States has attempted to use the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme to gain patent law reforms in Thailand. 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) introduced GSP in 
1971 for use by developed countries to reduce or waive custom duties for developing imports. 
Frances Williams, UNCTAD Aims to be More Flexible, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1992, at 5. Under 
United States law the President has the authority to provide duty-free treatment for any 
eligible article from any designated beneficiary developing country. 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1988). 
The President may consider a country's intellectual property protections in granting GSP 
benefits. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(5). On May 28, 1987, PMA filed a complaint under Sections 
501 and 502 of the 1974 Trade and Tariff Act and requested the suspension of Thailand's 
GSP benefits unless Thailand amended its Patent Act by March of 1988. Drug Makers' Group 
Files Complaint with USTR for Improved Patent Protection in Thailand, 4 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) 
744 (June 3, 1987). Action was not taken until January 19, 1989 when President Reagan 
only partially granted PMA's request and denied Thailand's request for additional duty-free 
treatment. Thailand Denied Certain GSP Benefits for Weak Intellectual Property Laws, 37 Pat. 
Trademark & Copyright]. (BNA) No. 915, at 279 (Jan. 26, 1989). This action affected $165 
million of Thai goods that would have been imported into the United States. Id. The threat 
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an investigation of Thailand's intellectual property system on March 
15, 1991. 155 Thailand became the focus of the USTR a second time 
on April 26, 1991 when, in response to Congressional pressure, the 
USTR upgraded Thailand to the status of a "priority country."156 
Thailand initiated its Patent Act amendments in October 1991, and 
by February 1992 the King had promulgated the Patent Act into 
law. 157 On March 13, 1992, the USTR announced that Thailand 
failed to protect United States patents, but delayed action until after 
the general election on March 22, 1992.158 On April 29, 1992, the 
USTR once again designated Thailand as a priority foreign coun-
try.159 Because of recent political turbulence in Thailand, the USTR 
has delayed trade sanctions until the formation of a new Thai 
government. 160 
of revoking GSP benefits does not have a substantial impact on Thailand, as only twenty-two 
percent of Thailand's total exports enter the United States with GSP privileges. Thailand 
Stands Firm on Pharmaceutical Patent Rights, PHARMACEUTICAL Bus. NEWS, Jan. 20, 1989, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Pbnws File. By contrast, the denial of GSP benefits would 
probably have a greater effect on a lesser-developed country such as Indonesia, which 
depends more heavily on foreign concessions. 
155 56 Fed. Reg. 11,815 (1991). 
156 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet: " Special 30 1" on Intellectual 
Property (Apr. 26, 1991). The USTR cited areas of deficiencies such as lack of patent protection 
for pharmaceuticals, overly broad compulsory licensing provisions, and insufficient term of 
protection. Id. China and India also were designated as priority foreign countries; this was 
the first time the USTR had designated a priority country. Id. Thailand had been on the 
"priority watch list" in previous years. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact 
Sheet: "Special 301" on Intellectual Property (Apr. 27,1990); 1989 Special 301 Fact Sheet, reprinted 
in 38 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 933, at 131 (June 1, 1989). The "priority 
watch list" designation is not provided by statute, but is the USTR's broadly interpreted 
"escape clause" to retaliation against priority countries. See Davis, supra note 143, at 524 
(arguing that Special 301 should be amended to provide for the USTR's discretionary 
approach). 
157 See supra part III (Thai Patent Act). 
158 USTR Finds Against Thailand on Patents, Delays Action Until After Thai Election, Daily 
Rep. for Exec. (BNA), Mar. 17, 1992, at A6. 
159 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet:" Special 301 "on Intellectual 
Property 1 (Apr. 29, 1992) [ hereinafter 1992 Special 301 Fact Sheet]. India and Taiwan also 
were named as priority foreign countries.Id. The United States subsequently suspended $60 
million of Indian products from the GSP scheme. Nancy Dunne, U.S. Hits India's Trade Status 
in Patent Dispute, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at 7. On June 5, 1992, Taiwan agreed to amend 
its patent law in conformance with the current GATT text. U.S., Taiwan Reach Agreement on 
Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, 9 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) 1001 (June 10, 1992). Those on the 
priority watch list include: Australia, Brazil, Egypt, European Community, Hungary, Korea, 
Philippines, Poland, and Turkey. 1992 Special 301 Fact Sheet, supra, at 2. Those on the watch 
list include: Argentina, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, EI Salvador, 
Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Peru, Spain, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Venezuela.Id. at 5. 
16°Id. at 2. 
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The newly amended Thai Patent Act, although not entirely 
acceptable to the United States, indicates the effectiveness of the 
Special 301 provisions to stimulate change. The central issue facing 
the United States is whether Special 301 retaliation should be used 
to force Thailand to further amend its Patent Act and omit com-
pulsory licensing provisions. The United States has refrained from 
using Special 301 retaliation because intellectual property protec-
tion is on the agenda in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) talks. 161 The United States, however, should con-
tinue to press Thailand for patent protection commensurate with 
Thailand's stage of economic development. In return, the United 
States should remove Thailand from the priority country list. 162 
Thailand's strained trade relationship with the United States can be 
rebuilt if Thailand significantly improves its Patent Act. 
B. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Because Special 301 is solely a retaliatory measure and does 
not provide dispute negotiation mechanisms, the United States 
places great importance on the success of the GATT talks. 163 Since 
its enactment, GATT continues to be the principle instrument of 
international law regulating trade discussion, negotiation, and set-
tlement. 164 GATT is based on the assumption that individual nations 
benefit from a combined effort to increase global trade. 165 
161 See Bello, 1989-1990 Special30I, supra note 143, at 275. 
162 Special 30 I has been successful in securing changes in the laws of foreign countries. 
After placement on the priority list in 1985, South Korea agreed to provide better protection 
for United States pharmaceutical patents. See Thomas N. O'Neill, III, Note, Intellectual 
Property Protection in Thailand: Asia's Young Tiger and America's "Growing" Concern, II U. PA. J. 
INT'L Bus. L. 603, 614 (1990). South Korea was subsequently transferred to the priority 
watch list. Id. The placement of Mexico on the priority watch list in 1989 encouraged Mexico 
to improve its patent protection for pharmaceuticals. Removal from all lists occurred when 
Mexico passed the Law for the Promotion and Protection of Industrial Property in June of 
1991. Manuel Gomez-Maqueo, Analysis of Mexico's New Industrial Property Law, 42 Pat., Trade-
mark & Copyright J. (BNA) 381 (Aug. 15, 1991). The Mexican law not only provides a 
twenty-year term for pharmaceutical patents, but also has compulsory licensing and working 
requirements. Id. 
163 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat., pt.5, A3, 55 
U.N.T.S. 187. GATT is a multilateral trade agreement and international organization. 
164 Mark Modak-Truran, Section 337 and GATT in the Akzo Controversy: A Pre- and Post-
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act Analysis, 22 INTELL. PROP. L. REV., 189,201 (1990). 
165Id. The two principles of Most-Favored-Nations Treatment (MFN) and National 
Treatment comprise the basic GATT structure. MFN Treatment requires a GATT-contract-
ing party to extend the same treatment given to its most favored trading partner regarding 
trade relations with all other GATT-contracting parties. GATT, supra note 163, art. I. 
National Treatment prevents discrimination against foreign goods by requiring that con-
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The most recent round of the 107 -nation GATT talks, the 
Uruguay Round, began in April, 1986.166 The addition of the Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) negotiating group is 
a significant departure from the traditional agenda of tariff reduc-
tion. 167 The inclusion of intellectual property in the GATT format, 
as advocated by industrialized nations, is a difficult social issue for 
developing nations. 168 Progress in the area of international patent 
protection through the GATT framework is questionable because 
combining different legal systems and economic theories to provide 
a patent system may not be universally fair.169 There remains much 
debate over whether the exclusive grant of an intellectual property 
right in the international arena is a desirable goal. 170 The United 
States argues that an agreement providing developing nations with 
a greater opportunity to sell their agricultural exports will encour-
age them to respect other countries' patent laws in exchange. l7l 
Developing countries, however, fear that the acceptance of GATT-
protected patents will adversely affect other areas of their trade if 
developed nations do not believe that developing nations are work-
ing fast enough to change their patent laws. 172 Because of the per-
ceived negative impact of intellectual property on domestic devel-
opment, developing countries favor a provision with public interest 
exceptions that would balance the strength of a patent law against 
the level of development. 173 
Another problematic issue related to the successful inclusion of 
intellectual property is that the GATT system addresses sovereign 
states and not the citizens of the contracting parties. 174 Thus, a 
tracting parties treat foreign imported goods in the same manner as national goods. Id. art. 
2. 
166 O'Neill, supra note 162, at 615. 
167 Robert E. Ruggeri, The Uruguay Round: Effects on u.s. Business, N.Y.L.j., Feb. 7, 1991, 
at 5. 
166 M.M. Kostecki, Sharing Intellectual Property Between the Rich and the Poor, 13 EUR. INTELL. 
PRoP. REv. 271, 272 (1991). 
169 See 1989 Comm. Hearing, supra note 1, at 27. 
170 See GACEK, supra note 140, at 5. 
171 Karen Tumulty, Nothing Short of a Miracle Needed at Trade Talks, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 
1991, at Dl8. 
172 Kostecki, supra note 168, at 272. 
175 1991 UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 82, at 193. 
174 Wolfgang Fikentscher, GATT Principles and Intellectual Property Protection, in ICC STUD-
IES IN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAw, GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 120 (Friedreich-Karl Beier & Ger-
hard Schricker eds., 1988). A contracting party is a nation that chooses to be bound by the 
GATT provisions. Champon, supra note 21, at 332-33. 
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United States pharmaceutical company would have to rely on the 
United States government to take up its causeP5 Under the GATT 
rules, an arbitration panel of five individuals settles disputes be-
tween contracting parties. 176 After this panel submits a written opin-
ion, the GATT council makes a final decision as to whether there 
is a violation of international law.177 The power to authorize retal-
iation is not granted often, as the GATT procedure requires con-
sensus. I78 
The lack of consensus in diverse subject areas and the subse-
quent slow pace of the GATT negotiations indicate that it is not an 
effective approach to the global commercial domain. After four 
years of difficult deliberations, the Uruguay Round talks broke 
down in Brussels on December 7, 1990, over the reduction of 
agricultural subsidies. 179 Progress in intellectual property matters 
came to a halt because the TRIPS negotiations are tied to the success 
of all negotiating groups.I80 
Negotiations were later revived and in December 1991, Arthur 
Dunkel, Director General of GATT, submitted a "final act" draft 
treaty for member countries to review. I81 Under this draft treaty, 
contracting parties must determine the appropriate methods of 
implementing the TRIPS agreement. I82 Patents must be available 
whether products are imported or locally produced. I83 This provi-
sion would require Thailand to change the compulsory licensing 
provisions in the Thai Patent Act. The term of protection is twenty 
years from the filing date. I84 This draft treaty gives contracting 
parties one year following the date of the agreement to apply these 
provisions. I85 Developing countries, however, can delay the transi-
175 Fikentscher, supra note 174, at 109. By contrast, a Convention system uses the court 
system of its member states. 
176 GACEK, supra note 140, at 5. 
177 Id. 
178Id. 
179 See Ruggeri, supra note 167, at 6. 
180 See Vincent Palladino, Lose in the Courts? Try Congress?, LEGAL TIMES, June 17, 1991, 
at 24. 
181 Howard LaFranchi, "Take-It-Or-Leave-It" Draft Treaty Offers Scant Hope for Talks, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 27, 1991, at 6. 
182 Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, GATT Doc. No. MTN.TNCIWIFA, § Y, Annex III (1991) [hereinafter TRIPs 
AGREEMENT]. 
18' Id. art. 27. 
184Id. art. 33. 
185Id. art. 65 § 1. 
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tion into GATT compliance for four years. 186 In areas of technology 
that are not protected as of the date of the TRIPS agreement, 
developing countries have an additional five years to change their 
domestic laws. 187 Least-developed countries have ten years from the 
date of the TRIPS agreement to comply, because of their need for 
flexibility to create a viable technological base. 188 Developed coun-
tries are also required to provide incentives to promote technology 
transfers into developing countries. 189 A TRIPS Council, separate 
from GATT, will monitor the agreement under the newly formed 
Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO).190 
From the perspective of the United States, the lengthy transi-
tional period is the major flaw of the TRIPS agreement. 191 The 
United States pharmaceutical industry also criticizes the lack of 
pipeline protection. Thailand, as part of the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN),192 supports the adoption of the com-
promise draft treaty for intellectual property.193 Thailand prefers 
the proposed delayed transitional periods over potential trade sanc-
tions under Special 301. 194 
The Uruguay Round is currently stalled because of continuing 
disagreements between the European Community and the United 
States on farm-subsidy cutS. 195 Dunkel hopes to conclude the talks 
by December 1992.196 The draft treaty calls for the developed world 
to be very patient, a very different approach from the United States' 
186 Id. art. 65 § 2. 
187Id. art. 65 § 4. 
188Id. art. 66 § 1. 
189 Id. art. 66 § 2. 
190 Id. Annex IV, art. 5 § 4. MTO is the institutional framework which will administer 
an Integrated Dispute Settlement System, thus eliminating the ability of the United States to 
use Special 301 provisions. See id. art. III § 4. 
191 U.S., E.C. Report No Progress in New Talks on Uruguay Round; Some Industries Critical, 9 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 49 (jan. 8, 1992). 
192 Founded in 1967 to foster intra-regional economic development, promote social 
progress, and ensure intra-regional peace, ASEAN is comprised of the nations of Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Antonia Hussey, Regional Devel-
opment and Cooperation through ASEAN, 81 GEOG. REv. 87 (1991). 
19S ASEAN to Use Dunkel's Text for Uruguay Round, AGENCE FRANCE I'RESSE, Jan. 28, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Afp File. 
194 Peter Ungphakorn, Pressure from U.S., FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1991, at 34. 
195 Roger Cohen, New Hope is Seen for Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1992, at D1. 
196 Dunkel Says His Deadline for Concluding GATT Talks is Now the End of the Year, 9 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 889 (May 20, 1992). If an agreement is reached, Congress must use its 
"fast-track" negotiating power-approve or reject any trade agreement negotiated by the 
administration without any amendments. 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Fast-
track power was extended on May 29, 1992. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2903(b) (West Supp. 1991). 
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fast-paced bilateral efforts. Consequently, the goal of establishing a 
GATT-regulated intellectual property system, which requires coun-
tries with diverse needs to subscribe to uniform standards, may not 
be achieved. 
VI. REGIONAL FREE TRADING AREAS: PROGRESS? 
Difficulties in negotiating a successful GATT agreement has 
created disillusionment over GATT's ability to regulate the global 
trading system. 197 The decline of United States leadership in the 
global trading arena has undermined support for a multilateral 
system of trade, thus encouraging a trend towards regionalism. 198 
If the membership does not agree on the recent GATT proposals, 
nations will be free to adhere to the guidelines of trading blocs or 
to unilaterally implement their own trade rules. 199 In the absence 
of a multinational framework, countries with the most protective 
statutes will be able to satisfy their trade policy objectives.20o The 
United States may "get tough" and harm Thailand's export econ-
omy by imposing Special 301 trade sanctions in retaliation to Thai-
land's refusal to grant "acceptable" pharmaceutical patent protec-
tion. 201 Regional trading zones such as the European Community 
(EC) and the emerging North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), however, are also very significant long-term concerns of 
Asian nations such as Thailand which fear a potential shift of jobs 
and investment to preferred trading partners within these blocs.202 
197 See Paul Blustein & Stuart Auerbach, Trade Blocs: Friend or Foe?, WASH. POST, June 
2, 1992, at HI. 
198 Richard S. Belous & Rebecca S. Hartley, Regional Trading Blocs: An Introduction, in 
THE GROWTH OF REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3-5 (Richard S. Belous 
& Rebecca S. Hartley eds., 1990). 
199 George White & Teresa Watanabe, Asian Economic Unity?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1991, 
at DI. 
200 Anthony McDermott, Tariffs and Trade-The Enduring Obstacles, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
1992, at 14. 
201 See supra part V.A (Special 301). 
202 See Blustein & Auerbach, supra note 197, at H4. On August 12, 1992, the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico announced their plan for NAFTA. Keith Bradsher, Economic 
Accord Reached by U.S., Mexico, and Canada to Lower Trade Barriers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, 
at A 1. The three countries have a combined population of 260 million and a total output of 
$6,000 billion. Bradsher, supra, at C3. NAFTA is a response to Canada and Mexico's increased 
number of production-sharing options with United States companies. See M. Delal Baer, 
North American Free Trade, 70 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 132, 140 (1991). Proponents ofNAFTA hope 
that it will enhance United States global competitiveness, as Asia has successfully used the 
production-sharing option to penetrate the United States market. Id. at 140. Mexico desires 
this outward looking framework because foreign investment is essential to its economic 
reform, and access to other markets such as Asia and the EC may become difficult. Id. All 
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The GATT system is open to all who agree to abide by mem-
bership rules. GATT principles support free trade based upon 
nondiscrimination and comparative advantage.203 By contrast, re-
gional trading blocs are not open to nations willing to follow the 
rules. 204 These groups are based upon the principles of discrimi-
nation, economic nationalism, and managed trade. 205 This strategic 
trade vision utilizes trade policies, investment strategies, and gov-
ernment activities to create economic advantages.206 As the attrac-
tiveness of regional trading blocs, whose smaller forums allow more 
expansive economic ties, gains momentum, the cumbersome nature 
of a multilateral intellectual property system linked to free trade 
principles will lose support.207 The current debate is whether these 
groupings will be vehicles for protectionism or alliances for free 
global trade. 208 Countries could utilize these regional agreements to 
adjust their economies and laws to address modern technological 
aspects of international trade such as intellectual property concerns. 
These regional groupings may result in the breakdown of the 
multilateral system.209 Inward-focused alliances could slow down 
world trade and effectuate a decrease in worldwide prosperity.210 
It may be difficult for Asia to accomplish its goals in this new world 
order because the divergent economic statuses of Asian countries 
cannot be articulated through a uniform response. 211 The Pacific 
three nations benefit, as Canada and Mexico are heavily dependent on ensured access to 
United States markets. Id. at 133-40. A long congressional battle is anticipated and the 
earliest approval will not occur until 1993. Bradsher, supra, at C3. 
The EC comprises three distinct communities: the European Coal and Steel Community, 
the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. WILLIAM 
RAWLINSON & MALACHY P. CORNWALL-KELLY, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 1 (1990). The 
ultimate goal of the EC is European unity and the main principle is nondiscrimination among 
nations of member states. Id. at 2. The creation of an internal market for the movement of 
goods, services, persons, and capital occurred on January 1, 1991. Id. The EC is a protectionist 
trading bloc due to its product standards and import barriers. See Peter Morici, Regionalism: 
Motivations and Risks, in THE GROWTH OF REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
135 (Richard S. Belous & Rebecca S. Hartley eds., 1990) [hereinafter REGIONAL TRADING 
BLOCS]. 
203 Belous & Hartley, supra note 198, at 3. 
204Id. at 2-3. 
205Id. 
206Id. at 4. 
207 See Blustein & Auerbach, supra note 197, at H4. 
208Id. 
209 Richard V.L. Cooper, Blocs: Making the Best of a "Second-Best" Solution, in REGIONAL 
TRADING BLOCS, supra note 202, at 32-33. 
210 Id. 
211 Dick K. Nanto, Asian Responses to the Growth of Trading Blocs, in REGIONAL TRADING 
BLOCS, supra note 202, at 93. 
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Rim countries depend on the United States export market, but 
Japan has a sizably larger global presence than countries such as 
Thailand. 212 The issue of whether Asian nations will be able to, or 
even should, participate in regional trading blocs is both economi-
cally and politically complicated because of the uncertain role of 
these new trading systems. 
A. Southeast Asia's Response to the Potential Breakdown of the Existing 
World Trading System 
The fear of being "left out" of the new world order and the 
emergence of stronger regional economic identities have encour-
aged Thailand and other Southeast Asian nations to assert a new-
found sense of economic unity and confidence through proposals 
of different types of trade-based Pacific Rim groupings.213 Although 
not an immediately available option to possible Section 301 retal-
iation by the United States, Thailand could eventually focus its 
efforts on redistributing its export market throughout ASEAN and 
Japan. Pacific Rim nations, however, fear that their traditional mar-
kets in the United States may be usurped by preferred trading 
partners in trading blocs, even if they comply with United States 
intellectual property policy demands.214 The potential ramifications 
of a successful Asian grouping are significant: Asia accounts for 
fifty percent of the world's population, and this consumer base and 
work force is rapidly expanding.215 
At the January 1992 ASEAN summit meeting, leaders an-
nounced a resolution of two recent proposals regarding ASEAN 
economic cooperation.216 First, ASEAN agreed to move slowly on 
the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC).217 The EAEC, formerly 
the East Asian Economic Group, was first proposed by Malaysia's 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad after the breakdown of the 
Uruguay Round in December of 1990.218 The EAEC, an intra-
212Id. at 93-100. 
213 See Kevin Brown, ASEAN Discusses Plan for Regional Free Trade Zone, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 
5, 1991, at 16; John Burgess, In Asia, If It Looks Like a Trade Bloc, WASH. POST, June 2,1991, 
at HI. 
214 See Charles P. Wallace, Southeast Asia Warms to Trade-Bloc Plan, L.A. TIMES, June I, 
1991, at A3. 
215 Joel Kotking, With U.S. Looking Other Way, Asia Goes Its Own Way, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 
1991, at M2. 
216 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), SINGAPORE DECLARATION OF 1992. 
217Id. at 6-7. 
218 See Henrik Hansen, Malaysia Proposes Asian Trading Blocs, E. ASIAN EXEC. REp., Jan. 
IS, 1991, at 4. 
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ASEAN trading bloc, would operate as a loose body within the 
eXlstmg Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)219 to discuss 
ways to promote trade.220 
Second, ASEAN leaders also agreed to implement an ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA)-Thailand's proposal for a free-trade 
zone-that would encompass 300 million people and create an 
ASEAN common market.221 The six-nation association will attempt 
to integrate its economies by reducing or eliminating tariffs on non-
agricultural goods within fifteen years beginning January 1, 1993.222 
AFTA will use the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) 
scheme in hopes of reducing tariffs to a range of zero to five 
percent.223 The fifteen groups of products subject to the first round 
of tariff cuts include pharmaceuticals.224 With Central and South 
America offering low cost labor and better strategic access to the 
North American market, this free trade accord is an important 
move towards attracting investment to Southeast Asia.225 Unlike its 
disapproval of the EAEC proposal, the United States does not op-
pose AFTA because its scope is smaller than the EAEC's.226 AFTA, 
however, is not a match for the EC or NAFTA. Because AFTA's 
219 APEC includes the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia,Japan, South 
Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong, China, and 
Taiwan. While APEC has not accomplished substantive changes, it agreed recently to create 
a permanent secretariat and budget for ten projects to promote regional cooperation and 
growth. James Sterngold, A Wary Step Toward Regional Cooperation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1991, 
§ 4, at 5; RICHARD D. FISHER, How BUSH CAN PREVENT CREATION OF AN ASIAN ANTI-U.S. 
TRADE BLOC 1 (Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 169, Oct. 31, 1991, updating AMER-
ICA'S ROLE IN PROMOTING PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, Asian Studies Center Backgroun-
der No. 100). 
220 See Sheila Tefft, Southeast Asians Inch Towards Developing Regional Trading Blocs, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 25, 1991, at 4. EAEC would include Indochina, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, China, South Korea, and Japan. Id. Slow movement towards complete reliance on 
intra-ASEAN trade is wise because the general reaction was that it is a political, not economic 
tool. Japan did not endorse the EAEC for fear of protectionist complaints from the United 
States. See Wallace, supra note 214, at A3. 
221 See SINGAPORE DECLARATION, supra note 216, at 5. 
222Id. 
223Id. The CEPT scheme allows countries to selectively delay cutting tariffs on products 
they consider too sensitive or products that are produced by an established domestic industry. 
Id. 
224Id. at 5-6. The other groups are vegetable oils, cement, chemicals, fertilizer, rubber 
products, leather products, pulp, textiles, ceramic and glass products, gems and jewelry, 
copper cathodes, electronics, and wooden and rattan furniture. Id. 
225 Michael Richardson, Can ASEAN Meet the EC Challenge? INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 21, 
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, IHT File. 
226 US Welcomes ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, Kyodo News Serv., Jan. 30, 1992, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Jen File. 
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scope is very narrow, ASEAN countries remain economically de-
pendent on the United States export market for the majority of 
their goods. Potential problems related to intra-ASEAN trade will 
be more easily addressed in this smaller forum. This limited re-
gional alliance, however, will not hinder the United States' efforts 
to effectuate change in Thailand's patent laws as long as the United 
States remains Thailand's largest export market.227 Frustrations 
with currently available methods to initiate dialogue between coun-
tries over intellectual property protection have challenged United 
States leaders to propose alternative systems. 
B. United States Initiative: H.R. 2569 
On June 6, 1991 Representative Philip M. Crane (R-Ill.) intro-
duced H.R. 2569.228 This bill encourages the establishment of bi-
lateral free trade areas between the United States and certain Pacific 
Rim countries.229 H.R. 2569 attempts to resolve Asian fears of a 
potential "fortress America" resulting from a successful NAFTA. 
In addition to the goals of eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
H.R. 2569's objective is to negotiate effective mechanisms for de-
veloping rules in the nontraditional area of intellectual property 
protection.230 This bill provides that "bilateral disputes between the 
United States and Pacific Rim countries could be more effectively 
resolved in the context of mutually agreed-upon disciplines and 
dispute settlement mechanisms rather than by issue-by-issue con-
frontations under Special 301 or other trade remedy laws."231 
This proposal to achieve foreign intellectual property protec-
tions through a bilateral forum is a more comprehensive solution 
than past efforts that merely threatened developing countries with 
trade retaliation. The United States and Thailand may be able to 
reach an understanding of their mutual concerns, and create a 
system that is acceptable to the particular needs of each country. 
The hope is that free trade would result in increased competition, 
the elimination of inefficiencies, and lower cost to consumers. H.R. 
2569 died in the House Ways and Means Committee at the close of 
227 See Blustein & Auerbach, supra note 197, at HI. 
228 137 CONGo REc. E2087 (daily ed. June 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Crane). 
229 These countries include ASEAN, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Japan, and Hong Kong. H.R. 2569, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1991). 
2.0Id. § 3(2)-(3). 
2.1Id. § 1(3). 
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the 102d Congress, but Representative Crane plans to re-introduce 
it in the upcoming term. 232 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The success of pharmaceutical patent legislation in Thailand 
depends on political stability and the country's long-term commit-
ment to economic and technological development. This transfor-
mation cannot be sustained by imitating technology; Thailand must 
invest financial and intellectual resources in its future. Improved 
patent laws will encourage more MN Cs to invest in Thailand and 
will build a stronger trade relationship with the United States. Sig-
nificant changes in Thailand's position, necessary to protect United 
States companies in the Thai pharmaceutical market, cannot be 
addressed effectively through the multilateral efforts of GATT. 
Bilateral action through Special 301 presently appears to be the 
most effective tool to protect MNCs until an alternative solution, 
such as a bilateral forum suggested by H.R. 2569, can be imple-
mented. The threat of trade retaliation, however, does not aid 
mutual long-term goals. Increased patent protection safeguards 
United States R&D investments and will enable Thailand to benefit 
from more sophisticated and safer pharmaceutical products. 
Achieving these goals requires an understanding of the economic, 
political, and social considerations of intellectual property protec-
tion within a global arena. While becoming competitive in the in-
ternational market is costly, Thailand has the potential for great 
economic rewards and social progress. By revising its Patent Act to 
protect pharmaceuticals-absent fallbacks such as compulsory licen-
sing or the Board of Pharmaceutical Patents-Thailand can pro-
mote better public health and economic growth. Thailand is able to 
take this next step; the United States, however, should not expect 
this to be an easy or even rapid transition for Thailand to achieve. 
Julie S. Park 
232 Telephone Interview with Meghan Muldoon, Legislative Assistant for Rep. Phillip M. 
Crane (Oct. 19, 1992). 
